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Abstract
The existence of evasion attacks during the test phase of machine learning algo-
rithms represents a significant challenge to both their deployment and understand-
ing. These attacks can be carried out by adding imperceptible perturbations to
inputs to generate adversarial examples and finding effective defenses and de-
tectors has proven to be difficult. In this paper, we step away from the attack-
defense arms race and seek to understand the limits of what can be learned in
the presence of an evasion adversary. In particular, we extend the Probably Ap-
proximately Correct (PAC)-learning framework to account for the presence of an
adversary. We first define corrupted hypothesis classes which arise from standard
binary hypothesis classes in the presence of an evasion adversary and derive the
Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC)-dimension for these, denoted as the adversarial VC-
dimension. We then show that sample complexity upper bounds from the Fun-
damental Theorem of Statistical learning can be extended to the case of evasion
adversaries, where the sample complexity is controlled by the adversarial VC-
dimension. We then explicitly derive the adversarial VC-dimension for halfspace
classifiers in the presence of a sample-wise norm-constrained adversary of the type
commonly studied for evasion attacks and show that it is the same as the standard
VC-dimension, closing an open question. Finally, we prove that the adversarial
VC-dimension can be either larger or smaller than the standard VC-dimension de-
pending on the hypothesis class and adversary, making it an interesting object of
study in its own right.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has become ubiquitous due to its impressive performance in domains as
varied as image recognition [47, 70], natural language and speech processing [22, 24, 38], game-
playing [11,56,69] and aircraft collision avoidance [41]. However, its ubiquity provides adversaries
with both opportunities and incentives to develop strategic approaches to fool machine learning
systems during both training (poisoning attacks) [8,40,57,64] and test (evasion attacks) [7,15,33,54,
55, 60, 74] phases. Our focus in this paper is on evasion attacks targeting the test phase, particularly
those based on adversarial examples which add imperceptible perturbations to the input in order
to cause misclassification. A large number of adversarial example-based evasion attacks have been
proposed against supervisedML algorithms used for image classification [7,15,18,33,60,74], object
detection [20, 51, 79], image segmentation [3, 30], speech recognition [16, 82] as well as other tasks
[21, 35, 42, 81]; generative models for image data [45] and even reinforcement learning algorithms
[39, 46]. These attacks have been carried out in black-box [6, 10, 19, 50, 58, 59, 74] as well as in
physical settings [26, 48, 68, 72].
To counter these attacks, defenses based on the ideas of adversarial training [33, 52, 75], input de-
noising through transformations [5,23,25,66,80], distillation [62], ensembling [1,4,73] and feature
nullification [76] have been proposed. A number of detectors [29, 30, 32, 34, 53] for adversarial
examples have also been proposed. However, recent work [12–14] has demonstrated that modifi-
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cations to existing attacks are sufficient to generate adversarial examples that bypass both defenses
and detectors. In light of this burgeoning arms race, defenses that come equipped with theoretical
guarantees on robustness have recently been proposed [44, 63, 71]. These have been demonstrated
for neural networks with up to four layers.
In this paper, we take a more fundamental approach to understanding the robustness of supervised
classification algorithms by extending well-understood results for supervised batch learning in sta-
tistical learning theory. In particular, we seek to understand the sample complexity of Probably
Approximately Correct (PAC)-learning in the presence of adversaries. This was raised as an open
question for halfspace classifiers by Schmidt et al. [65] in concurrent work which focused on the
sample complexity needed to learn specific distributions. We close this open question by showing
that the sample complexity of PAC-learning when the hypothesis class is the set of halfspace clas-
sifers does not increase in the presence of adversaries bounded by convex constraint sets. We note
that the PAC-learning framework is distribution-agnostic, i.e. it is a statement about learning given
independent, identically distributed samples from any distribution over the input space. We show
this by first introducing the notion of corrupted hypothesis classes, which arise from standard hy-
pothesis classes in the binary setting in the presence of an adversary. Now, in the standard PAC
learning setting, i.e. without the presence of adversaries, the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC)-dimension
is a way to characterize the ‘size’ of a hypothesis class which allows for the determination of which
hypothesis classes are learnable and with how much data (i.e. sample complexity). In the adversar-
ial setting, we introduce the notion of adversarial VC-dimension which is the VC-dimension of the
corrupted hypothesis class. With these definitions in place, we can then prove sample complexity
upper bounds from the Fundamental Theorem of Statistical Learning in the presence of adversaries
that utilize the adversarial VC-dimension.
In this setting, we explicitly compute the adversarial VC-dimension for the hypothesis class com-
prising all halfspace classifiers, which then directly gives us the sample complexity of PAC-learning
in the presence of adversaries. This hypothesis class has a VC-dimension of 1 more than the di-
mension of the input space when no adversaries are present. We prove that this does not increase
in the presence of an adversary, i.e., the adversarial VC-dimension is equal to the VC-dimension for
the hypothesis class comprising all halfspace classifiers. Our result then raises the question: is the
adversarial VC-dimension always equal to the standard VC-dimension? We answer this question
in the negative, by showing explicit constructions for hypothesis classes and adversarial constraints
for which the adversarial VC-dimension can be arbitrarily larger or smaller than the standard VC-
dimension.
Contributions: In this paper, we are the first to provide sample complexity bounds for the problem
of PAC-learning in the presence of an adversary. We show that an analog of the VC-dimension
which we term the adversarial VC-dimension suffices to understand both learnability and sample
complexity for the case of binary hypothesis classes with the 0-1 loss in the presence of evasion
adversaries. We explicitly compute the adversarial VC-dimension for halfspace classifiers with
adversaries with standard ℓp (p ≥ 1) distance constraints on adversarial perturbations, and show that
it matches the standard VC-dimension. This implies that the sample complexity of PAC-learning
does not increase in the presence of an adversary. We also show that this is not always the case by
constructing hypothesis classes where the adversarial VC-dimension is arbitrarily larger or smaller
than the standard one.
2 Adversarial agnostic PAC-learning
In this section, we set up the problem of agnostic PAC-learning in the presence of an evasion adver-
sary which presents the learner with adversarial test examples but does not interfere with the training
process. We also define the notation for the rest of the paper and briefly explain the connections be-
tween our setting and other work on adversarial examples.
We summarize the basic notation in Table 1. We extend the agnostic PAC-learning setting intro-
duced by Haussler [36] to include an evasion adversary. In our extension, the learning problem
is as follows. There is an unknown P ∈ P(X × C).1 The learner receives labeled training data
(x, c) = ((x0, c0), . . . , (xn−1, cn−1)) ∼ Pn and must select hˆ ∈ H. The adversary receives a
1Formally, we have a sigma algebra Σ ⊆ 2X×C of events and P(X × C) is the set of probability measures
on (X × C,Σ). All hypotheses must be measurable functions relative to Σ.
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Symbol Usage
X Space of examples
C = {−1, 1} Set of classes
H ⊆ (X → C) Set of hypotheses (labelings of examples)
ℓ(c, cˆ) = 1(c 6= cˆ) 0-1 loss function
R ⊆ X × X Binary nearness relation
N(x) = {y ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ R} Neighborhood of nearby adversarial examples
Table 1: Basic notation used
labeled natural example (xTest, cTest) ∼ P and selects y ∈ N(xTest), the set of adversarial examples
in the neighborhood of xTest. The adversary gives y to the learner and the learner must estimate cTest.
R is the binary nearness relation that generates the neighborhoodN(x) of possible adversarial sam-
ples. We require N(x) to be nonempty so some choice of y is always available.2 When R is the
identity relation, IX = {(x, x) : x ∈ X}, the neighborhood is N(x) = {x} and y = xTest, giv-
ing us the standard problem of learning without an adversary. If R1, R2 are nearness relations and
R1 ⊆ R2, R2 represents a stronger adversary. One way to produce a relation R is from a dis-
tance d on X and an adversarial budget constraint ǫ: R = {(x, y) : d(x, y) ≤ ǫ}. This provides
an ordered family of adversaries of varying strengths and has been used extensively in previous
work [17, 33, 65].
Now, we define the Adversarial Expected and Empirical Risks to measure the learner’s performance
in the presence of an adversary.
Definition 1 (Adversarial Expected Risk). The learner’s risk under the true distribution in the pres-
ence of an adversary constrained by the relation R is
LP (h,R) = E(x,c)∼P [ max
y∈N(x)
ℓ(h(y), c)].
Let h∗ = argminh∈H LP (h,R). Then, learning is possible if there is an algorithm that, with high
probability, gives us hˆn such that LP (hˆn)− LP (h∗)→ 0.
Since the learner does not have access to the true distribution P , it is approximated with the dis-
tribution of the empirical random variable, which is equal to (xi, ci) with probability 1/n for each
i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Definition 2 (Adversarial Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM)). The adversarial empirical risk
minimizer AERMH,R : (X × C)n → (X → C) is defined as
AERMH,R(x, c) = argmin
h∈H
L(x,c)(h,R),
where L(x,c) is the expected loss under the empirical distribution.
Clearly, a stronger adversary leads to worse performance for the best possible classifier and in turn,
worse performance for the learner.
Lemma 1. Let A : (X ×C)n → (X → C) be learning algorithm for a hypothesis classH. Suppose
R1, R2 are nearness relations and R1 ⊆ R2. For all P ,
inf
h∈H
LP (h,R1) ≤ inf
h∈H
LP (h,R2).
For all P and all (x, c),
LP (A(x, c), R1) ≤ LP (A(x, c), R2).
Proof. For all h ∈ H,
{(x, c) : ∃y ∈ N1(x) . h(y) 6= c} ⊆ {(x, c) : ∃y ∈ N2(x) . h(y) 6= c}
so LP (h,R1) ≤ LP (h,R2).
2Additionally, for all y ∈ X , {x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ R} should be measurable.
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In other words, if we design a learning algorithm for an adversary constrained byR2, its performance
against a weaker adversary is better.
While it is clear that the presence of an adversary leads to a decrease in the optimal performance
for the learner, we are now interested in the effect of an adversary on sample complexity. If we add
an adversary to the learning setting defined in Definition 3, what happens to the gap in performance
between the optimal classifier and the learned classifier?
Definition 3 (Learnability). A hypothesis class H is learnable by empirical risk minimization in
the presence of an evasion adversary constrained by R if there is a function mH,R : (0, 1)
2 → N
(the sample complexity) with the following property. For all 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < ǫ < 1, all
n ≥ mH,R(δ, ǫ), and all P ∈ P(X × C),
Pn
[{
(x, c) : LP (AERMH,R(x, c), R) − inf
h∈H
LP (h,R) ≤ ǫ
}] ≥ 1− δ.
3 Adversarial VC-dimension and sample complexity
1
−1
(a) Optimal evasion attacks against
halfspace classifiers
1 ⊥ −1
(b) Corrupted halfspace classifier
Figure 1: Combining the
family of hypotheses with
the nearness relationR. The
top figure depicts some h ∈
H and the bottom shows
κR(h) ∈ H˜.
In this section, we first describe the notion of corrupted hypotheses,
which arise from standard hypothesis classes with the addition of an
adversary. We then compute the VC-dimension of these hypotheses,
which we term the adversarial VC-dimension and use it to prove the
corresponding Fundamental Theorem of Statistical Learning in the
presence of an adversary.
3.1 Corrupted hypotheses
The presence of the adversary forces us to learn using a corrupted
set of hypotheses. Unlike ordinary hypotheses that always output
some class, these also output the special value ⊥ that means “al-
ways wrong”. This corresponds to the adversary being able to select
whichever output does not match c(x). This is illustrated in Figure
1.
Let C˜ = {−1, 1,⊥}, where⊥ is the special “always wrong” output.
We can combine the information in H and R into a single set H˜ ⊆
(X → C˜) by defining the following mapping where κR : (X →
C)→ (X → C˜) and κR(h) : X → C˜:
κR(h) = x 7→

−1 ∀y ∈ N(x) : h(y) = −1
1 ∀y ∈ N(x) : h(y) = 1
⊥ ∃y0, y1 ∈ N(x) : h(y0) = −1, h(y1) = 1.
The corrupted set of hypotheses is then H˜ = {κR(h) : h ∈ H}.
We note that the equivalence between learning an ordinary hypoth-
esis with an adversary and learning a corrupted hypothesis without an adversary allows us to use
standard proof techniques to bound the sample complexity.
Lemma 2. For any nearness relation R and distribution P ,
LP (h,R) = LP (κR(h), IX ).
Proof. Let h˜ = κR(h). For all (x, c),
max
y∈N(x)
ℓ(h(y), c) = 1(∃y ∈ N(x) . h(y) 6= c) = 1(h˜(x) 6= c) = max
y∈{x}
ℓ(h˜(y), c)
so LP (h,R) = E[maxy∈N(x) ℓ(h(y), c)] = E[maxy∈{x} ℓ(h˜(y), c)] = LP (h˜, IX ).
Now we define the loss classes (composition of loss and classifier functions) F , F˜ ⊆ (X × C˜ →
{0, 1}) derived from H and H˜ respectively: F = {λ(h) : h ∈ H} and F˜ = {λ(h˜) : h˜ ∈ H˜}.
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Here, λ : (X → C˜) → (X × C˜ → {0, 1}) and λ(h) : X × C˜ → {0, 1} is defined as λ(h) =
(y, c) 7→ 1(h(y) 6= c). This is the first step in the Rademacher complexity approach to proving
sample complexity bounds.
Lemma 3 ( [67] Theorem 26.5). Let fˆ = λ(κ(AERMH,R(x, c))). With probability 1− δ,
EP (fˆ(x, c)) − inf
f∈F˜
EP (f(x, c)) ≤ 2R(F˜(x, c))) +
√
32 log(4/δ)
n
where
F˜(x, c) = {(f˜(x0, c0), . . . , f˜(xn−1, cn−1)) : f˜ ∈ F˜}
R(T ) = 1
n2n
∑
s∈{−1,1}n
sup
t∈T
sT t
Typically, this result is stated as an upper bound on LP (hˆ) − infh∈H LP (h). In our case, fˆ and f∗
do not necessarily arise from any standard (i.e. not corrupted) classifier. To get an equivalent version
of the result that suits our needs, we have simply expanded the standard definition of LP (·).
3.2 Adversarial VC-dimension: VC-dimension for corrupted hypothesis classes
We begin by providing two equivalent definitions of a shattering coefficient, which we use to deter-
mine VC-dimension for standard binary hypothesis classes and adversarial VC-dimension for their
corrupted counterparts.
Definition 4 (Equivalent shattering coefficient definitions). The ith shattering coefficient of a family
of binary classifiersH ⊆ (X → C) is σ(H, i) = maxy∈X i |{(h(y0), . . . , h(yi−1)) : h ∈ H}|.
The alternate definition of shatter in terms of the loss class F ⊆ (X × C → {0, 1}) is
σ′(F , i) = max
(y,c)∈X i×Ci
|{(f(y0, c0), . . . , f(yi−1, ci−1)) : f ∈ F}|.
Now, we show that these two definitions are indeed equivalent. If F achieves k patterns on (y, c),
thenH achieves k patterns on y. IfH achieves k patterns on y, then F achieves k patterns on (y, c)
for any choice of c. Thus, σ(H, i) = σ′(F , i).
The ordinary VC-dimension is then VC(H) = sup{n ∈ N : σ(H, n) = 2n} = sup{n ∈ N :
σ′(λ(H), n) = 2n}. The second definition naturally extends to our corrupted classifiers, H˜ ⊆
(X → C˜), because λ(H˜) ⊆ (X × C → {0, 1}).
Definition 5 (Adversarial VC-dimension). The adversarial VC-dimension is
AVC(H, R) = sup{n ∈ N : σ′(λ(H˜), n) = 2n}.
These definitions and lemmas can now be combined to obtain a sample complexity upper bound for
PAC-learning in the presence of an evasion adversary.
Theorem 1 (Sample complexity upper boundwith an evasion adversary). For a spaceX , a classifier
familyH, and an adversarial constraint R, there is a universal constant C such that
mH,R(δ, ǫ) ≤ C d log(d/ǫ) + log(1/δ)
ǫ2
.
where d = AVC(H, R).3
Proof. This follows from Lemma 2, Lemma 3, the Massart lemma on the Rademacher complexity
of a finite class [67], and the Shelah-Sauer lemma [67].
3This can be improved via the chaining technique.
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4 The adversarial VC-dimension of halfspace classifiers
In this section, we consider an adversary with a particular structure, motivated by the practical ℓp
norm-based constraints that are usually imposed on evasion adversaries in the literature [17,33]. We
then derive the adversarial VC-dimension for halfspace classifiers corrupted by this adversary and
show that it remains equal to the standard VC-dimension.
Definition 6 (Convex constraint on binary adversarial relation). LetB be a nonempty, closed, convex,
origin-symmetric set.
The seminorm derived from B is ‖x‖B = inf{ǫ ∈ R≥0 : x ∈ ǫB} and the associated distance
dB(x, y) = ‖x− y‖B.
Let VB be the largest linear subspace contained in B.
The adversarial constraint derived from B is R = {(x, y) : y − x ∈ B}, or equivalently N(x) =
x+ B.
Since B is convex and contains the zero-dimensional subspace {0}, VB is well-defined. Note that
this definition of R encompasses all ℓp bounded adversaries, as long as p ≥ 1.
Definition 7. LetH be a family of classfiers on X = Rd.
For an example x ∈ X and a classifier h ∈ H, define the signed distance to the boundary to be
δB(h, x, c) = c · h(x) · inf
y∈X :h(y) 6=h(x)
dB(x, y)
For a list of examples x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Xn, define the signed distance set to be
DB(H,x, c) = {(δB(h, x0), . . . , δB(h, xn−1)) : h ∈ H}
LetX = Rd and letH be the family of halfspace classifiers: {(x 7→ sgn(aTx−b)) : a ∈ Rd, b ∈ R}.
For simplicity of presentation, we define sgn(0) = ⊥, i.e. we consider classifiers that do not give a
useful value on the boundary. It is well known that the VC-dimension of this family is d + 1 [67].
Our result can be extended to other variants of halfspace classifiers. In Appendix A, we provide an
alternative proof that applies to a more general definition.
For halfspace classifiers, the set DB(H,x, c) is easily characterized.
Theorem 2. Let H be the family of halfspace classfiers of X = Rd. Let B be a nonempty, closed,
convex, origin-symmetric set. Let R = {(x, y) : y−x ∈ B}. Then AVC(H, R) = d+1−dim(VB).
In particular, when B is a bounded ℓp ball, dim(VB) = 0, giving AVC(H, R) = d+ 1.
Proof. First, we show AVC(H, R) ≤ d + 1 − dim(VB). Define ‖w‖B∗ = supy∈B wT y, the dual
seminorm associated with B.
For any halfspace classifier h, there are a ∈ Rd and b ∈ R such that f(x) = sgn(g(x)) where
g(x) = aTx − b. Suppose that aT y = 0 for all y ∈ VB. Let H′ be the set of classifiers that
are represented by such a. For a labeled example (x, c), the signed distance to the boundary is
c(aTx − b)/‖a‖B∗ . Any point on the boundary can be written as x− ǫz for some ǫ ≥ 0 and z ∈ B.
We have aT (x− ǫz)− b = 0 so
dB(x, x − ǫz) ≥ ǫ = a
Tx− b
aT z
≥ a
Tx− b
‖a‖B∗ . (1)
Because B is closed, there is some vector z∗ ∈ B that maximizes aT z. The point x− aT x−b‖a‖B∗ z
∗ is on
the boundary, so the inequality 1 is tight.
If we add the restriction ‖a‖B∗ = 1, each h ∈ H′ has a unique representation as sgn ◦g. For
inputs from the set G = {(a, b) ∈ Rd+1 : ‖a‖B∗ = 1, ∀y ∈ VB . aT y = 0}, the function (a, b) 7→
δB(f, x, c) is linear. Thus the function (a, b) 7→ (δB(f, x0, c0), . . . , δB(f, xn−1, cn−1)) is also linear.
G is a subset of a vector space of dimension d+ 1− dimVB , so
dim(span(DB(H′,x, c))) ≤ d+ 1− dimVB
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for any choices of x and c.
Now we consider the contribution of the classifiers in H \ H′. These are represented by a such that
aT y 6= 0 for some y ∈ VB , or equivalently ‖a‖B∗ = ∞. In this case, for all (x, c) ∈ Rd × C,
aT (x+VB) = R. Thus x+VB intersects the classifier boundary, h˜(x) = ⊥, and the distance from x
to the classifier boundary is zero: δB(h, x, c) = 0. ThusDB(H \ H′,x, c) = {0}, which is already
in span(DB(H′,x, c)).
LetU = span(DB(H,x, c)), let k = dim(U), and let n > k. Suppose that there is a list of examples
x ∈ Xn and a corresponding list of labels c ∈ Cn that are shattered by the degraded classifiers H˜.
Let η ∈ {0, 1}n be the error pattern achieved by the classifier h. Then ηi = 1(δB(h, xi, ci) ≤ 1).
In other words, the classification is correct when ci and h(xi) have the same sign and the distance
from xi to the classification boundary is greater than 1.
Let 1 be the vector of all ones. For each error pattern η, there is some h ∈ H that achieves it if and
only if there is some point inDB(H,x, c)− 1 with the corresponding sign pattern.
If k < n, then by the following standard argument, we can find a sign pattern that is not achieved by
any point in U − 1. Let w ∈ Rn satisfy wT z = 0 for all z ∈ U , w 6= 0, and wT1 ≥ 0. There is a
subspace of Rn of dimension n− k of vectors satisfying the first condition. If n > k, this subspace
contains a nonzero vector u. At least one of u and −u satisfies the third condition.
If a point z ∈ U − 1 has the same sign pattern as w, then wT z > 0. However, we have chosen
w such that wT z ≤ 0. Thus the classifier family H does not achieve all 2n error patterns, which
contradicts our assumption about (x, c).
Now we show AVC(H, R) ≥ d+ 1− dim(VB) by finding (x, c) that are shattered by H˜.
Let t = d− dim(VB), x0 = 0, and (x1, . . . , xt) be a basis for the subspace orthogonal to VB . Then
ǫ = min
0≤i<j≤t
‖xi − xj‖B∗ > 0,
so the example list 3
ǫ
(x0, . . . , xt) is shattered by H˜ for any choice of c.
5 Adversarial VC Dimension can be larger
Figure 2: The examples x0 =
(−1, 1) and x1 = (1,−1) are
marked with crosses. The func-
tion h(0,1) ∈ H maps the smaller
square to 1 and everything else
to −1. The degraded function
h˜(0,1) ∈ H˜ maps the larger square
to ⊥ and everything else to −1.
Observe that h˜(0,1)(x0) = ⊥ and
h˜(0,1)(x1) = −1.
We have shown in the previous section that the adversarial
VC-dimension can be smaller than or equal to the standard
VC-dimension. Here, we provide explicit constructions for the
counter-intuitive case when adversarial VC-dimension can be
arbitrarily larger than the VC-dimension.
Theorem 3. For any d ∈ N, there is a spaceX , an adversarial
constraint R ⊆ X × X , and a hypothesis class H : X → C
such that VC(H) = 1 and AVC(H, R) ≥ d.
Proof. Let X = Zd. LetH = {hx : x ∈ X}, where
hx(y) =
{
1 y = x
−1 y 6= x.
The VC dimension of this family is 1 because no classifier out-
puts the labeling (1, 1) for any pair of distinct examples.
Consider the adversary with an ℓ∞ budget of 1. No de-
graded classifier will ever output 1, only 0 and ⊥. Take
x = (x0, . . . , xd−1) ∈ (Zd)d:
(xi)j =
{−1 i = j
1 i 6= j.
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Now consider the 2d classifiers that are the indicators for y ∈
{0, 1}[d]: h˜y = κ(hy). Observe that
h˜y(xi) =
{−1 yi = 1
⊥ yi = 0
because if yi = 1 then d∞(xi, y) = 2 but if yi = 1 then d∞(xi, y) = 1. Thus
(fy(x0), . . . , fy(xd−1)) contains ⊥ at each index that y contains 1. If the examples are all labeled
with −1, this subset of the degraded classifier family achieves all 2d possible error patterns. The
adversarial VC dimension is at least d.
This example shows that an adversary can not only affect the optimal loss, as shown in Lemma 1,
but can also slow the convergence rate to the optimal hypothesis.
6 Related work and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we are the first to demonstrate sample complexity bounds on PAC-learning in the
presence of an evasion adversary. We now compare with related work and conclude.
6.1 Related Work
The body of work on attacks and defenses for machine learning systems is extensive as described
in Section 1 and thus we only discuss the closest related work here. We refer interested readers to
extensive recent surveys [9, 49, 61] for a broader overview.
PAC-learning with poisoning adversaries: Kearns and Li [43] studied learning in the presence of
a training time adversary, extending the more benign framework of Angluin and Laird [2] which
looked at noisy training data.
Classifier-specific results: Wang et al. [77] analyze the robustness of nearest neighbor classifiers
while Fawzi et al. [27, 28] analyze the robustness of linear and quadratic classifiers under both
adversarial and random noise. Hein and Andriushchenko [37] provide bounds on the robustness of
neural networks of up to one layer while Weng et al. [78] use extreme value theory to bound the
robustness of neural networks of arbitrary depth. Both these works assume Lipschitz continuous
functions. In contrast to our work, all these show how robust a given classifier is and do not address
the issue of learnability and sample complexity.
Distribution-specific results: Schimdt et al. [65] study the sample complexity of learning a mixture
of Gaussians as well as Bernoulli distributed data in the presence of ℓ∞-bounded adversaries. For the
former, they show that for all classifiers, the sample complexity increases by an order of
√
d, while
it only increases for halfspace classifiers for the latter distribution. Gilmer et al. [31] analyze the
robustness of classifiers for a distribution consisting of points distributed on two concentric spheres.
In contrast to these papers, we prove our results in a distribution-agnostic setting.
Wasserstein distance-based constraint: Sinha et al. [71] consider a different adversarial constraint,
based on the Wasserstein distance between the benign and adversarial distributions. They then study
the sample complexity of Stochastic Gradient Descent for minimizing the relaxed Lagrangian for-
mulation of the learning problem with this constraint. Their constraint allows for different samples
to be perturbed with different budgets while we study a sample-wise constraint on the adversary.
Objective functions for robust classifiers: Raghunathan et al. [63] and Kolter and Wong [44] take
similar approaches to setting up a solvable optimization problem that approximates the worst-case
adversary in order to carry out adversarial training. Their focus is not on the sample complexity
needed for learning, but rather on provable robustness achieved against ℓ∞-bounded adversaries by
changing the training objective.
6.2 Concluding remarks
While our results provide a useful theoretical understanding of the problem of learning with ad-
versaries, the nature of the 0-1 loss prevents the efficient implementation of Adversarial ERM to
obtain robust classifiers. In practice, recent work on adversarial training [33, 52, 75], has sought to
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improve the robustness of classifiers by directly trying to find a classifier that minimizes the Adver-
sarial Expected Risk, which leads to a saddle point problem [52]. A number of heuristics are used
to enable the efficient solution of this problem, such as replacing the 0-1 loss with smooth surro-
gates like the logistic loss and approximating the inner maximum by a Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD)-based adversary [52] or by an upper bound [63]. Our framework now allows for an analysis
of the underlying PAC learning problem for these approaches. An interesting direction is thus to
find the adversarial VC-dimension for more complex classifier families such as piece-wise linear
classifiers and neural networks. Another natural next step is to understand the behavior of convex
learning problems in the presence of adversaries, in particular the Regularized Loss Minimization
framework.
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A Alternative upper bound for halfspace classifiers
In this section, we will define halfspace classifiers in a way that is slightly more general than the
most common option. Many authors do not specify what a halfspace classifier does to a point
on it boundary. Others restrict the classifier to take a constant value there. We will require only
the following property: for a halfspace classifier h, the set {x ∈ Rn : h(x) = 1} and the set
{x ∈ Rn : h(x) = −1} must both be convex.
Now we present an upper bound on adversarial VC-dimension that applies for this more general
definition.
Lemma 4. Let V = Rd/VB, let H be the family of halfspace classifiers of V , and let F˜ =
{λ(κR(h)) : h ∈ H}. For n ≥ d + 2 − dimVB , let x ∈ V n and c ∈ {−1, 1}n. Then there
is some error pattern η ∈ {−1, 1}n such that f˜(x, c) 6= η for all f˜ ∈ F˜ .
12
Proof. Let [n] = {0, . . . , n− 1}. The vector space U = {a ∈ Rn :∑i∈[n] ai = 0} has dimension
n−1. The function φ : U → V , φ(a) =∑i∈[n] aixi is linear and the dimension of V is d−dim VB ,
so the nullspace of φ has dimension at least n − 1 − d ≥ 1. Thus there are coefficients a in this
nullspace such that
∑
i∈[n] |ai| = 2.
Let J = {i ∈ [n] : ai > 0} and K = {i ∈ [n] : ai < 0}, so
∑
i∈J ai =
∑
i∈K −ai = 1. We have∑
i∈[n] aixi = 0, so
∑
i∈J aixi =
∑
i∈K −aixi. Call this point z. Let
J+ = {i ∈ J : ci = 1} α+J =
∑
i∈J+ |ai|
J− = {i ∈ J : ci = −1} α−J =
∑
i∈J− |ai|
K+ = {i ∈ K : ci = 1} α+K =
∑
i∈K+ |ai|
K− = {i ∈ K : ci = −1} α−K =
∑
i∈K− |ai|.
Suppose that α+J +α
−
K ≥ α−J +α+K . We will show that the error pattern η such that ηi = 1(sgnai 6=
ci) is not achieved. If this inequality does not hold, we can work with−a instead of a, or equivalently
switch the roles of J andK , and thus η such that ηi = 1(− sgnai 6= ci) is not achieved.
Suppose that there is some h ∈ H such that λ(κR(h)(x), c) = η. Then each example with index in
J+ orK− must be classified correctly and each example with index in J− orK+ must be classified
incorrectly. For each i ∈ J−, there is some δi ∈ B such that h(xi + δi) = 1. Similarly, for each
i ∈ K+, there is some δi ∈ B such that h(xi + δi) = −1. For i ∈ J+, h(xi + δi) = 1 because all
of xi + B must be classified as 1. Similarly, for i ∈ K−, h(xi + δi) = −1 because all of xi + B
must be classified as −1.
All of this is summarized as follows:
Set sgnai ci ηi Behavior of h near xi
i ∈ J+ +1 +1 0 ∀δi ∈ B h(xi + δi) = +1
i ∈ J− +1 −1 1 ∃δi ∈ B h(xi + δi) = +1
i ∈ K+ −1 +1 1 ∃δi ∈ B h(xi + δi) = −1
i ∈ K− −1 −1 0 ∀δi ∈ B h(xi + δi) = −1.
Let
δ =
1
α−J + α
+
K
∑
i∈J−∪K+
aiδi =
1
α−J + α
+
K
(∑
i∈J−
aiδi +
∑
i∈K+
(−ai)(−δi)
)
.
Then δ is is a convex combination of points in B, so δ ∈ B. Because α+J + α−K ≥ α−J + α+K , the
rescaled vector
α
−
J
+α+
K
α
+
J
+α−
K
δ is in B as well. For i ∈ J+ ∪K−, let δi = −α
−
J
+α+
K
α
+
J
+α−
K
δ.
Because h(xi + δi) = 1 for all i ∈ J , if z′ is a convex combination of those points, then h(z′) = 1.
Let z′ be the following convex combination of perturbed examples indexed by J :
∑
i∈J
ai(xi + δi) =z +
∑
i∈J−
aiδi − α
−
J + α
+
K
α+J + α
−
K
δ
∑
i∈J+
ai
=z +
∑
i∈J−
aiδi − α
+
J
α+J + α
−
K
∑
i∈J−∪K+
aiδi
=z +
α−K
α+J + α
−
K
∑
i∈J−
aiδi − α
+
J
α+J + α
−
K
∑
i∈K+
aiδi
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We can obtain the same point z′ as a convex combination of perturbed examples indexed byK:∑
i∈K
−ai(xi + δi) =z −
∑
i∈K+
aiδi +
α−J + α
+
K
α+J + α
−
K
δ
∑
i∈K−
ai
=z −
∑
i∈K+
aiδi +
α−K
α+J + α
−
K
∑
i∈J−∪K+
aiδi
=z − α
+
J
α+J + α
−
K
∑
i∈K+
aiδi +
α−K
α+J + α
−
K
∑
i∈J−
aiδi.
Because h(xi + δi) = −1 for all i ∈ K , h(z′) = −1. Thus there is no classifier h that achieves
η.
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